A first objective of this paper is to emphasise the role of a correct diagnosis of unemployment persistence for the design of effective active labour market policies. A second is to stress the importance of adequate incentives to programme administrators of active labour market policies, and that this may well be more important than providing adequate incentives to the unemployed. To illustrate this, we summarise two case studies evaluating active labour market policies in Belgium. The first one evaluates a work experience programme for welfare recipients. The second one analyses the short-term effect of vocational training programmes for unemployed workers on the probability of leaving unemployment. Finally, we invite economists to think harder about well designed performance-standards systems. We provide some guidelines for this research programme.
Introduction
The last two decades the design of unemployment benefit schemes has been criticised uninterruptedly. These schemes have been conceived at a time when high and structural unemployment did not exist. They aimed at providing insurance against the risk of temporary income loss caused by involuntary lay-off. They were not designed to deal with persistent income loss facing the current jobless.
There is a widespread belief that it is partly the benefit scheme itself that causes a "culture" of benefit dependency and therefore persistent unemployment. Schemes need reform to induce the unemployed to find jobs as quickly as possible, countering thereby this process of dependency. This has lead to two types of policy reforms. The first type consists in sanctioning unemployed workers. These sanctions consist of unconditional or conditional benefit reductions. If conditional, these benefit reductions typically depend on the elapsed unemployment duration, on the refusal of a "suitable" job offer, or on the lack of proof of sufficient job search effort (see OECD 2000 and Grubb 2000 for a survey of this literature and the paper of Van der Linden and Dor in this volume). The second type of policy reform proposal is to activate the unemployed by mandating participation to active labour market programmes, such as job search, work experience and vocational training programmes.
The activation of the unemployed is a policy advice that is clearly based upon the commonly held view that long spells of unemployment are a cause of unemployment persistence rather than its consequence. Sneessens 1994, Drèze and Sneessens 1997 , for instance, call this view in question, at least for countries like France or Belgium. Moreover, there are other views on the causes of unemployment persistence. A first objective of this paper is to emphasise the role of a correct diagnosis of unemployment persistence for the design of effective active labour market policies.
A second objective of this paper, is to stress the importance of the design of adequate incentives to programme administrators of active labour market policies, and that this may well be more important than providing adequate incentives to the unemployed. Programme administrators may use a programme in order to serve their own objectives, rather than the programme objectives. What use is it to encourage workers to participate in programmes if these do not enhance their employability, but merely serve the interests of programme administrators? Moreover, current performance-standards systems, attempting to bring programme administrators to the type of discipline that markets bring to firms, are often not well designed and may do more harm than good. We therefore invite economists to think harder about well designed performance-standards systems. We provide some guidelines for this research programme.
In order to illustrate the crucial role of correct incentives to programme administrators, we summarise two case studies evaluating active labour market policies in Belgium. The first one evaluates a work experience programme for welfare recipients. It is a clear example of how an improperly designed subsidy scheme can serve objectives of administrators rather than those of the programme. The second case study analyses the short-term effect of a vocational training programme for unemployed workers on the probability of leaving unemployment. Even if the programme administrators were not guided by an explicit performance-standards system, training is found to be effective. The paper is structured as follows. First, we underline how the effectiveness of particular labour market policies is related to a correct diagnosis of the underlying causes of unemployment persistence. The Belgian case is focused upon. In Section 3 we discuss what role economic incentives can play in the effectiveness of active labour market policies. A final section concludes.
Policy Effectiveness and the Underlying Causes of Unemployment Persistence
We claim that a correct diagnosis of the underlying causes of unemployment persistence in Europe is crucial for an effective design of active labour market policies 2 . This claim is only valid, however, to the extent that unemployment persistence is not caused by wage rigidity, or more generally by too strict labour market regulations. In this view, optimal policy simply consists in trying to revert to the first-best competitive economy. In such an economy, flexible wages and a perfectly de-regulated labour market have completely absorbed unemployment. If so, the design of active labour market policies can logically not depend on the underlying causes of unemployment persistence. Active labour market policies are then justified to the extent that they can restore other market failures. For instance, job search programmes can improve the functioning of the labour market in that they can temper the inefficiencies induced by information asymmetries between workers and firms. Subsidy schemes for vocational training can be a response to capital market imperfections or to the existence of poaching externalities between firms providing on-the-job training (see Booth and Snower 1996) . I have two responses to this critique. First, even if de-regulation could eliminate unemployment it is not necessarily desirable from a normative point of view. For, the reduction of unemployment persistence has to be to be traded-off against more income inequality and poverty. Second, economists generally over-emphasise the gains in terms of unemployment reductions or more general measures of efficiency to be obtained from labour market de-regulation and under-estimate the costs (OECD 1990 (OECD , 1994 .
Labour market regulations can enhance efficiency in a number of ways. For instance, laws that limit dismissal, income protection programmes and maternity leave programmes create long-term incentives to employers and workers to invest in human capital and provide opportunities to children of these workers to invest in health and education paying off in terms of future adult productivity. Moreover, regulations can improve the quality of job matches, reduce turnover costs faced by firms, reduce the risk facing workers and families, and preclude employers from monopsonistic behaviour (Blank and Freeman 1994, Gregg and Manning 1996) . Once we agree that labour market regulation cannot be the sole explanation of the high and persistent unemployment in Europe, and that some amount of regulation can even reduce unemployment, we are in a position to accept that a policy aiming at a reversion to the first best competitive economy is not necessarily efficient. In such a second-best (or third-best) world active labour market policies may have a role to play in tackling unemployment. Moreover, we argue that the optimal design of active labour market policies in such a world will depend on the underlying causes of unemployment persistence.
We consider four explanations of unemployment persistence in Europe and their implications for the design of active labour market policies. We do not claim that these explanations exhaust the list of possible causes. The first explanation is essentially the explanation given in the introduction, which says that it is essentially the inadequate design of the unemployment benefit schemes that is responsible for an increasing dependency of unemployed workers. The second explanation is the increasingly popular view that the persistence in unemployment is a consequence of a structural mismatch between the demand and the supply for low skilled workers. Finally, we consider two explanations that relate the persistence of high unemployment to depressed capital accumulation and therefore to the slowdown of economic growth. The explanations differ from each other in the way in which these capital shortages are generated. Daveri and Tabellini (1997) argue that the excessively high costs of labour has reduced the incentive to invest and thus to grow. Drèze (1997) , and Shadman-Mehta and Sneessens (1998) relate under-investment to a co-ordination failure in the expectation formation of firms and workers sustained by wage rigidity. For instance, if workers, for some reason, expect to remain unemployed, they will cut back on purchases. If this in turn affects demand expectations of firms, this co-ordination failure could lead to under-investment and therefore unemployment. We will assume that the latter two explanations in combination with the phenomenon of job competition can explain why the lower skilled workers are mainly affected by the unemployment risk 3 . Job competition is the phenomenon that higher skilled workers crowd out lower skilled workers in a competition for jobs.
Aggregate flow statistics generally show that the probability of re-employment decreases with unemployment duration. This "negative duration dependence" supports the thesis that the unemployment benefit scheme, requiring workers to restrain from working to be eligible, induces dependency and therefore unemployment persistence (Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991) . The arguments are twofold. First, unemployment induces a process of de-motivation or habituation, leading to reductions in job search activity and therefore to a declining probability of leaving unemployment. Alternatively, a long spell of unemployment leads to skill deterioration and loss of work habits. This process downgrades the value of the worker on the labour market, and, if potential employers observe it, the latter will be less inclined to hire the less productive worker. The latter process can be reinforced in a context of imperfect information, in which the employer is imperfectly informed about the productivity of applicants. In such an environment the employer may use unemployment duration as a signal for the quality of the worker and therefore for recruitment purposes rank candidates according their unemployment duration (Blanchard 1991 and Blanchard and Diamond 1994) . This recruitment behaviour can induce negative duration dependence in the hiring rates, even if the former explanations have only a negligible impact. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) have argued that these negative effects on the employability of unemployed workers are one of the main channels of unemployment persistence in Europe. According these authors, a succession of negative economic shocks, combined with the higher mentioned disemployability effects has reduced the effective labour supply and consequently the rise of persistent long-term unemployment during the eighties. When economic activity resumes, the long-term unemployed are no longer effective candidates to fill job vacancies, which leads to labour shortages even when unemployment is high. Moreover, the lack of competitiveness of the unemployed "outsiders" reinforces the bargaining power of the employed "insiders" in their demand for salary increases, thereby tempering employment growth. These two factors inhibit the unemployment rate to return to its initial equilibrium level.
What are the policy prescriptions implied by this diagnosis? If unemployment generates a process of de-motivation, deterioration of skills and loss of work experience, conditioning receipt of benefits on participation in active labour market programmes is a way out. Mandatory job-search programmes 4 may counter de-motivation. Temporary work experience programmes work as a preventive policies 5 , up-keeping skills and work habits. If the abovementioned process has been ongoing for some time, curative policies, such as training are more adapted. Long-term unemployed or dislocated workers may first need to participate in a training programme to upgrade lost skills. Finally, if habituation to unemployment is a problem, mandatory participation to these programmes may be required (see Calmfors 1994, p.24) . Note many of the Belgian active labour market policies share similar features (see Dejemeppe and Cockx 1998) . It is therefore important to verify whether the diagnosis on which these policy prescriptions is based, can be supported by empirical facts. This is where we now turn to.
This diagnosis of unemployment persistence seems to be supported by the observation that the aggregate exit rate out of unemployment 6 displays negative duration dependence. This negative duration dependence can, however, be "spurious". The decline in the aggregate exit rates may merely reflect a sorting process induced by heterogeneity in the unemployment population. If workers entering the unemployment state are heterogeneous, the workers with the most favourable labour market characteristics, the "high skilled" say, leave this state rapidly, leaving behind the "low skilled" workers. Even if individual exit probabilities are constant with duration, this sorting process will cause the aggregate exit rate to decrease with duration, because it is calculated as the average exit rate over those workers who are still unemployed beyond the duration under consideration. Since high skilled workers leave unemployment rapidly, the average is calculated over a group of which the share of low skilled workers increases with duration. The aggregate exit rate declines therefore with duration, merely because it is calculated on an increasing proportion of low skilled workers for whom the exit rate is low at any duration. Consequently, the observed negative duration dependence in the aggregate exit rate does therefore not imply that the chances of leaving unemployment decrease with duration for an individual worker. The above-mentioned diagnosis implies, however, negative duration dependence in the individual chances rather than in the aggregate exit rate. 4 More generally, job search programmes decrease the mismatch in the supply and demand for labour. 5 Work experience programmes can be curative, in a way "last resort" programmes, if on-the-job training complements them (see below). The training content of such programmes is, however, often difficult to verify. 6 The aggregate exit rate after an unemployment duration ofuarters is calculated, within a given calendar time period, as the ratio of the total number of workers leaving unemployment within the q th quarter to the total number of workers unemployed at the beginning of the q th quarter. 
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Cockx and Dejemeppe (2000), for instance, disentangled "true" from "spurious" duration dependence of the exit rates for a sample of unemployed men living in Wallonia (Belgium) in the June 1989 -February 1994 period. This period covers a downturn of the business cycle. Figure 1 summarises their findings. In order to focus on the dependency question the exit rates out of unemployment are normalised to one at the beginning of the unemployment spell. After an elapsed duration of three and a half years, the observed aggregate exit rate has declined to a level that is merely 10% of the initial rate. After correction for "spurious" duration dependence, the exit rate is roughly constant during the first one and a half years, where after it decreases gradually to a level that is only 30% below its initial rate after three and a half years. The strong decrease in the observed aggregate exit rate is therefore essentially the result of heterogeneity in the population of unemployed workers.
On the basis of these results, we conclude that negative duration dependence of the exit rates out of unemployment, even if it plays a role, cannot be the main channel of unemployment persistence in Belgium. To the extent that the design of active labour market policies crucially depends on the diagnosis of unemployment persistence, these results call for policy reform in Belgium 7 . Moreover, these findings call for prudence and at least for some differentiation in the policy prescriptions according to the nature of unemployment persistence in the EU. Similar findings are reported for other European countries (Machin and Manning 1999) . On the other hand, true negative duration dependence is far more important in the UK (van den van Ours 1994 and ).
An alternative theory, that is compatible with the high degree of heterogeneity in the exit rates out of unemployment, is the increasingly popular view of a structural skill mismatch (cf. e.g. Sneessens 1994 , Drèze and Sneessens 1997 , Van der Linden 1997 , Berman, Bound and Machin 1998 . According to this view technological change that is biased in favour of skilled labour, perhaps combined with a globalisation of the world economy, has led to a structural collapse in the demand for unskilled workers. This collapse in the demand, jointly with a wage structure that is downwards rigid, causes high unemployment to be concentrated on the less skilled experiencing long spells of unemployment. Long-term unemployment is here a consequence of the lack of demand for the services for low skilled workers rather than of a process inducing negative duration dependence in the exit rates out of unemployment.
Policy prescriptions are different if this is the correct diagnosis of unemployment persistence. Temporary work experience programmes are unlikely to be very effective. For, to the extent that the work experience programme has little training content, it does not impact on the structural imbalance between demand and supply of labour. Schooling and training programmes, on the other hand, are more promising, as they can reduce the gap between the demand and supply of skills. However, there exist limits to the returns of training, especially for youth tired of being in school. Drèze and Malinvaud (1994) propose therefore permanent reductions of labour costs targeted to low-wage workers in order to create a demand for low skilled jobs. On-the-job training can be a valuable complement to these policies.
The central Belgian authorities currently provide reductions in the social insurance contributions of employers for low-wage workers. The amount of the reductions are, however, still quite modest and outlays on them are significantly lower than on the ("Maribel") across the board subsidies in the industrial sector (Dejemeppe and Cockx 1998, p.197) . Moreover, even if Belgium spends more (1,4% of GDP in 1995) on active labour market policies than the EU on average (1,1% of GIP), its composition does not accommodate to the diagnosis of structural skill mismatch. In 1995 only 11% of public outlays to active labour market policies were spent on training for unemployed workers and for workers at risk of being made redundant. Another 14% are spent on the training of youth and to workers in employment. The remainder 75% is mainly spent on temporary recruitment subsidies or direct job creation in the public or non-profit sector (OECD 1997, p. 99 ).
There are, however, competing explanations compatible with the high degree of heterogeneity in the exit rates out of unemployment. If either too high labour costs or the above-mentioned co-ordination failures (Drèze 1997, and Shadman-Mehta and Sneessens 1998) can explain unemployment persistence, job competition can cause heterogeneity in the exit rates. The idea is that in periods of high unemployment, high skilled workers fill vacancies intended for lower skilled workers and/or employers raise the required skill level of vacancies even if the job requirements are unchanged (van Ours and Ridder 1995) . If this were the diagnosis of persistent unemployment, policies stimulating economic growth, be it by an across the board reduction of labour costs (Daveri and Tabelini 1997) or by a "two-handed growth strategy using both demand-and supply-side policy instruments" (Shadman-Mehta and Sneessens 1998), are sufficient to cope with unemployment persistence and to simultaneously improve the relative position of the less skilled workers in the labour market. There is no need for targeting the job creation. Furthermore, training policies targeted on particular groups would be inefficient, as they would only lead to a redistribution of unemployment between different categories of workers.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle whether it is skill mismatch or job competition that is the principal cause of the heterogeneity in the exit rates out of unemployment. Dejemeppe Cockx and Van der Linden (2000) , for example, show that both models can reproduce the observed exit rates out of unemployment. Identification requires either to constrain the empirical model by imposing further theoretical restrictions or to add information on the skills requirements of the vacancies filled by unemployed workers. Further research is required on this issue.
We conclude that the design of active labour market policies depend on the diagnosis of the causes of the high persistent unemployment in Europe. This diagnosis may vary between countries in the EU. One should therefore avoid imposing uniform guidelines on the design of active labour market policies in the member states of the EU.
Incentives: Do they matter?

Incentives to Unemployed Workers
Economic analysis has paid much attention to the question of adequate incentives to unemployed workers. An optimal benefit scheme, within this line of research, is one in which unemployed workers are held responsible for the cost that their unemployment imposes on society. Unemployed workers can only be held responsible for costs they control. However, the diagnosis of unemployment persistence in countries such as France or Belgium suggests that the majority of the unemployed workers do not have any control of these costs. Be it as a consequence of structural skill mismatch or of job competition, there is insufficient demand for low-skilled workers in these countries. Inducing the low-skilled unemployed workers to search harder for jobs or mandating participation to work experience programmes is therefore not going to make much of a difference. Moreover, mandating participation to training programmes can be counterproductive. For, the mandatory nature of the programme will distort allocative efficiency and waste resources if the worker is not convinced of the value of participation 8 . This does not mean that adequate incentives to unemployed workers do not matter at all. It is rather a question of priority. Incentives may matter once the low skilled worker regains control over his situation. But this is presently not at issue.
There is a second reason why unemployed workers may be out of control of the social costs that unemployment imposes on society. Programme administrators can inhibit workers to participate in labour market programmes, even if their participation is socially cost-effective. Alternatively, programme administrators can mandate participation of workers for whom participation imposes a cost on society. The reason is that program administrators may use a programme to serve their own objectives, rather than those of the programme. In such cases providing correct incentives to unemployed workers is again not a priority. One first needs to align the objectives of administrators to those of societyWe believe that this issue deserves more attention. This what we do in the following section.
Incentives to Programme Administrators
In this section two case studies illustrate the importance of adequate incentives for the design of active labour market policies. The first case study demonstrates how adverse incentives to programme administrators can indeed render a programme ineffective. On the basis of a second case study, we show that programme objectives can be attained, even if there is no explicit monetary incentive scheme that points administrators in the "right" direction. Finally, we investigate the implications of these findings for the design of performance standard systems in labour market programmes.
The case studies two active labour market programmes in Belgium such as they were operating during the late eighties and the beginning of the nineties. As in many European countries standardised unemployment rates in Belgium have been rising uninterruptedly since the beginning of the seventies from roughly 2% in 1971 to more than 12% in 1982 (Van der Linden 1997, p. 69). Since 1982 this rate has continuously decreased to slightly more than 7% in 1990. In the beginning of the nineties unemployment rose again until to peak again close to 10% between 1994 and 1996. Since 1988 the unemployment rate has been always been slightly (about 1%) below the European average (OCDE 1997, p.8) . The Belgian labour market is characterised, however, by large regional disparities. For instance, the official unemployment rate reports in 1993 an unemployment rate of 13% for Flanders, the Flemish speaking region in the North, and of 25% in Wallonia, the French speaking region in the South (Van der Linden 1997, p.72).
a) Case-Study 1: A Work Experience Programme for Welfare Recipients in Belgium
In this first case study we summarise a study of Cockx and Ridder (2000) evaluating the effect of a temporary subsidised public sector work experience programme without training content, henceforth "Social Employment" (SE). This programme aimed at the re-integration of welfare (public assistance) recipients in the regular labour market in Belgium and was administrated by the local welfare agencies also charged to paying out the Minimum Income Guarantee to which welfare recipients are entitled in Belgium (see Box 1). As discussed in Section 2, such programmes can cope with sources of unemployment persistence induced by a process of discouragement, of loss of work habits or of skill deterioration. We advanced, however, that for Belgium this couldn't be the major source of unemployment persistence. Here we focus on an alternative source of inefficiency: adverse incentives to the administrators of this programme.
Box 1 Institutional Features of the SE programme
In Belgium the welfare system is a safety net for those who are not covered by social insurance, because of insufficient work experience, delay in administrative procedures, or because they have been punished by the social insurance administration. Individuals, who pass a means test, can claim a supplement to their income up to the legally determined Minimum Income Guarantee at the welfare agency of their municipality. During the 1987-90 period on average 52,659 adults and 31,672 children received the determined Minimum Income Guarantee at any given time (Cockx 1992, p.36) . This is roughly 0.8% of the Belgian population. To compare, in January 1989, 389,672 individuals received Unemployment Insurance benefits (Cockx 1992, p.39) . The number of welfare recipients is relatively small, because unemployment insurance benefits have an indefinite duration 9
. After a waiting period of six months, even school-leavers are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
Legislation stipulates that welfare agencies may employ welfare recipients for a period that is sufficiently long 10 to entitle them to unemployment benefits. This type of employment is called 9 There is one exception to this rule. Cohabitants who are not the head of a family can lose entitlement to unemployment benefits on grounds of "excessive" duration. 10 Unemployment benefits are only paid to workers who, within a specified period prior to their claim, have been employed for at least 75 days if younger than 18, and up to 600 days if older than 50 (Van Langendonck 1991, p. 450).
Social Employment (SE). During the 1987-90 period on average 1282 individuals received SE at each instant of time. This is 2.4% of the adult welfare population.
The possibility to employ welfare recipients for this purpose brought legislation into agreement with the principle that social assistance offers relief only if the main social insurance system fails to do so. The national and regional 11 authorities have gradually widened the scope of SE as a means of enhancing the integration of the poor. This is reflected in increased financial support to welfare agencies offering SE. The regional authorities subsidise SE in Flanders since 1983 and in the Walloon provinces since 1989. The central authorities finance 50% of the Minimum Income Guarantee paid by the local welfare agencies. Since 1985 the welfare agencies remain entitled to this subsidy if it socially employs the welfare recipient, and since January 1993 the subsidy is up to 100% of the Minimum Income Guarantee.
A prerequisite for the effectiveness of a work experience program is that the responsible agencies foster the re-employment of inactive workers. In Belgium, the local welfare agencies that are in charge of SE, not only run the program, but they also provide community services, as services to nursing homes, hospitals and homes for the elderly, and meals and cleaning services for households in need of support. Consequently, the welfare agencies do not have an incentive to stimulate re-integration in the regular labour market. First, as labour costs are subsidised, as employer, they rather have an incentive to employ the most productive welfare recipients, who could easily find a regular job on their own, as cheap labour for the provision of these services (see Box 2). Second, since programme participants are after a while entitled to benefits of the National unemployment insurance scheme (see Box 1), even if not reemployed, they will not burden the agency's future outlays on welfare benefits.
Box 2 SE as Cheap Labour
Welfare agencies can save on outlays by employing welfare recipients. An example clarifies this point 12 . Consider a welfare recipient living alone somewhere in Flanders in January 1989. The net monthly cost of SE for this individual is the cost of the minimum wage for the employer (=49,354 Belgian Francs) minus the central authorities' subsidy amounting to 50% of the Minimum Income Guarantee (=8,152 BEF) and the regional authorities' subsidy (=30,500 BEF): 10,702 BEF. Moreover, during the initial period of SE, during which the participant would otherwise depend on welfare, the WELFARE AGENCY no longer needs to pay welfare benefits and therefore saves additionally at least 13 50% of the Minimum Income Guarantee (=8,152 BEF) minus the regional subsidy for welfare (=1,141 BEF), that is 7,011 BEF. This implies that employing in SE a worker, who initially produces goods and services with a value of more than 3,691 BEF per month and later on of more than 10,702 BEF per month, is financially attractive to the welfare agency. The welfare agency need not worry about costs after SE, because after SE welfare recipients are entitled to social insurance benefits, and hence will not depend financially on the welfare agency. We conclude that SE 11 Readers who are familiar with the Belgian institutional setting will notice that we use regional in a loose sense. As such, we can divide Belgium into 4 regions: Flanders, referring to the Flemish (Dutch) speaking community in the North; the Walloon provinces, referring to the French speaking community in the South; Brussels, referring to the region of the bilingual community of the capital city; the German speaking community in the East. Given the marginal importance of the latter region, we ignore it in the sequel. 12 The figures in the example are taken from an internal document of a welfare agency to which we had access. 13 Welfare agencies can offer a supplement to the Minimum Income Guarantee financed out of their own means.
can result in savings for welfare agencies. These savings are larger if the welfare agency "cream skims" the most productive recipients for participation in the programme. This observation is not only valid for the specific example. However, the magnitude of the savings differs with the level of the Minimum Income Guarantee 14 , the time period and the region. For instance, Brussels does not provide a specific subsidy for SE and due to the growing popularity of the programme in Flanders the level of the subsidy per participant declined over time. In the case of a lower subsidy the welfare agency can maintain savings by being more selective in the choice of participants. The specific subsidy rules provide no incentive to the welfare agency to use SE as a means to integrate welfare recipients in the labour market. Any effort to this effect will only increase its expenditures.
Empirical findings confirm the ineffectiveness of the SE programme. First, participants are hired in jobs requiring few qualifications. Women are typically (95%) employed in the domestic services provided by the welfare agency. This work involves cleaning, cooking, washing and ironing. Men are required to do all kinds of odd jobs (37%), to maintain roads or to plant vegetation (13%), to help in the kitchen (10%), to do administrative work (10%) (see Van de Velde 1990, p.55) . These kind of low-skilled jobs are unlikely enhancing the employability of welfare recipients, in particular if administrators select those who are already sufficiently skilled for participation. Moreover, this conclusion is corroborated by the findings of Van de Velde (1990, p. iv) that SE was hardly accompanied by training and assistance, and that the welfare agencies encouraged only 6% of the participants to apply for another job. Cockx and Ridder (2000) estimate the effect of programme participation on the rate at which welfare is left. Estimation of this effect requires information on the counterfactual rate at which programme participants would have left welfare if they had not participated in the programme. In order to estimate this counterfactual probability, the econometrician has to make assumptions. A simple one would consist in assuming that this counterfactual rate corresponds to the average (observed) rate at which non-participants leave welfare. We mentioned above, however, that welfare agencies have an incentive to select into SE the most productive welfare recipients, likely to leave welfare for employment rapidly anyhow. If so, the rate at which non-participants leave welfare must underestimate the above-mentioned counterfactual rate. This is what is referred to as the "selection bias" in the evaluation literature (see e.g. Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999) . In order to avoid this bias other assumptions are required. The interested reader should read the paper of Cockx and Ridder (2000) for further discussion of the methodology.
The estimation results can be summarised as follows. If the authors do not correct for the selection bias, participation in SE reduces the median welfare spell from 13.1 to 11.6 months 15 . The corresponding coefficient is significantly different from 0. If, however, a correction is applied, evidence of substantial cream skimming in the selection process is found. Participation in SE then reduces the exit rate from welfare, be it that the effect is not significantly different from 0. The median duration of a welfare spell is 12.5 months for nonparticipants and 14.8 months for participants in SE. This effect is shown to be stable with respect to a sensitivity analysis in a number of alternative directions 16 . These findings confirm that welfare agencies face adverse incentives rendering the SE programme ineffective. Programme participation increases welfare dependency rather than reducing it.
In other European countries, program administrators face similar adverse incentives. For instance, in Germany the dramatic rise in unemployment since the early nineties has increased the number of welfare recipients substantially. In response, several municipalities, like Leipzig, Frankfurt and Lübeck, now offer temporary employment to welfare recipients in municipal job-creation companies, the so-called "Beschäftigungsgesellschaften". Feist and Schöb (1999) argue that municipalities can benefit from these initiatives for reasons similar to those in Belgium. First, the job-creation companies provide local public goods. Second, after being employed for a year the participants are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits of the "Bundesanstalt für Arbeit", a federal authority. Consequently, the German municipalities have similar adverse incentives as the welfare agencies in Belgium 17 .
The British Youth Training Scheme (YTS) of the second half of the eighties provides an example in which private employers face adverse incentives. Participants in the YTS are placed in a job where they can acquire work experience. Trainees were paid an allowance (set slightly above the unemployment benefits level) and firms could employ trainees without incurring any further wage costs. As the welfare agencies in Belgium, firms could therefore gain from cheap labor. Moreover, firms did not have explicit incentives to increase the employability of trainees. The work experience was supplemented by classroom training, but one can have serious doubts on the quality of this training component, as this was a constant theme in discussions of reform. Dolton et al. (1994) find that ex-trainees obtain jobs at a slower rate than non-trainees even when the time spent in YTS is excluded 18 .
Work experience programs that place participants in jobs that do not require much training induce (public or private) employers to hang on to the participants for the subsidy period. After this period, employers, who have not invested in the participants, have little incentive to keep them. For example, Edin and Holmlund (1990) report that participation in temporary jobs in the public sector in Sweden decreases the re-employment rate of young and displaced workers 19 . Bonnal et al. (1997) find that in France lower educated young workers participating in public employment programs do not have a higher transition rate from unemployment to employment after program participation. Moreover, participation decreases this transition rate for workers with a professional or technical diploma 20 .
b) Case Study 2: Vocational Training for Unemployed Workers in Wallonia (Belgium)
Cockx and Bardoulat (1999) estimate, for the 1989-1993 period in Wallonia 21 , the effect of vocational training for unemployed workers (see Box 3 for institutional details) on allows for a different the SE-effect for 1987-88 and for 1988-90. These estimates confirm that participation in SE enhances welfare dependency, and in line with expectations, less so in the second sub-period. 17 We are not aware of any study evaluating this program. Eichler and Lechner (1998) find that public employment programs reduce the unemployment risk for participants in the East German State of Sachsen-Anhalt. However, this study could not distinguish employment in the municipal 'Beschäftigungsgesellschaften' from other public employment programs. 18 Female (but not male) ex-trainees obtain 'good' jobs at a faster rate than non-trainees when time spent on YTS is excluded. 19 The authors do find that program participation reduces the length of subsequent unemployment spells. However, the study imposes strong parametric (Weibull) restrictions on the baseline hazard and does not explicitly account for selection on unobservables, which may bias the results. 20 According to the authors, the latter finding suggests that participation in such programs may signal low job performance 21 The French speaking region in the south of Belgium. unemployment duration. As in the previous study, the time spent on the programme is included in this duration. Again the study considers only the short run impact of training on the transition rate out of unemployment. This is justified in that the literature (see Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999 for a survey) generally reports that classroom training increases the employment probability and not so much the earnings or the length of employment spells.
Box 3 Vocational Training in Wallonia
In Wallonia the regional public employment agency, FOREM, is the main operator of vocational classroom training for adult unemployed workers 22 . For this purpose, it has a chain of training centres at its disposal widely dispersed over the territory of the Walloon region. FOREM provides vocational training for a wide range of professions of the secondary and tertiary sector. Apart from vocational training, it also offers services information, vocational guidance and work experience to a more disadvantaged population of unemployed workers in its Centres of Reception, and of Guidance and Socio-Professional Initiation (C.A./C.O.I.S.P). During the 1989-93 period, about two thirds of the available training slots are of the vocational type, each sector being equally important. In terms of hours of training, the share of vocational training increases to 85% 23 . The level at which vocational training is offered varies, but the majority of the programmes consists in the development of basic skills required in particular vocations. The data that were used for the evaluation study did not allow distinguishing between the different programme types. The estimated effect of participation to training is therefore necessarily an average effect over the wide variety of programmes offered.
The paper reports that, during participation, the rate at which unemployment is left decreases by 27%. After participation, the transition intensities increase by a factor 1.62. This demonstrates that the described training programme significantly decreased unemployment duration of participants. The reported impacts are, however, average effects of training for those workers who effectively participate in training. In reality, only about 3.5% of the unemployed workers participate or have participated in training at any instant of time. Since participants have higher returns to training 24 than non-participants do (see Box 4), we expect the impact of training for an unemployed worker with average returns to be much lower than those reported above. On the basis of some (restrictive) assumptions the authors show how one can extrapolate the above-mentioned findings to estimate the latter impact. The transition rate out of unemployment would only decrease by 5% on average during participation, but more importantly, after participation, the transition rate out of unemployment is on average only 13% higher. This suggests that the effectiveness of the programme may decrease very rapidly with its coverage.
Finally, note that the study neither finds evidence of cream skimming, nor of positive discrimination in the selection process. This need not contradict the argument that the 22 More details of the institutional framework can be found in OCDE (1997) . 23 In the sequel figures for which no source are mentioned are taken from FOREM (1989-94) or from unpublished document of the employment agency. 24 The returns to training are defined as the extent to which training speeds up the rate at which unemployment is left. This needs to be distinguished from the intrinsic rate at which a candidate for training leaves unemployment without having participated in training. It is the latter that determines whether there is any selection bias (cream skimming or positive discrimination) in the estimated return of workers that effectively participate in training. If there is selection in the returns, i.e. if only those with high returns participate, this implies that the programme would be less effective if one allows the current non-participants to participate. selection process favours workers with the highest high returns to training to participate in training (see Box 4). It only implies that there is no correlation between the returns to training and the chances of finding a job in the absence of training.
Box 4 The Selection into the Training Programme
What determines participation into these training programmes? In principle no restrictions are imposed. Participation is voluntary and any unemployed worker can apply. However, eligibility requires candidates to pass tests on basic reading and writing when applying for a training programme in the tertiary sector and on calculation in the secondary sector. In addition, they need to pass medical and psycho-technical tests. These tests are uniform over training centres and types. Subsequently, programme administrators select candidates on the basis of some vague criteria as "motivation". Finally, because there is an excess demand for training, candidates are registered on a waiting list 25 until a new training session of their choice starts off.
Neither training centres, nor administrators or instructors are financially rewarded on the basis of placement ratios or to other labour market outcomes. Consequently, direct incentives to cream-skim candidates, likely to find jobs even without participation in the programme, are absent. Even if we cannot evaluate for certain the implicit selection criteria of the programme administrators, selection seems therefore rather to be based on criteria that affect the returns to training than on the absolute employability of the worker.
Workers are not only selected into the programme, however. The costs imposed on the participation in a training programme induce a process of self-selection. Only workers with high returns to training can compensate for these costs and participate. Participation costs are partially reimbursed to the participant. First, a trainee remains entitled to unemployment benefits. Moreover, he/she is paid 40 BEF (= 1 EURO) for each effective training hour and is reimbursed transportation costs. The candidate trainee must, however, bear two main costs: the application costs and the earnings forgone during the period in which the candidate trainee is waiting to enter training 26 . The application costs are the cost of gathering information on the programme, as well as the time, effort and transportation costs of the higher mentioned test and interview. Second, as a consequence of the limited training capacity, the candidate must be ready to wait before he or she can participate in training. This means that participation in training requires the worker to reject job offers during this waiting period.
What can we conclude from the positive findings of this case study? The findings suggest that it is more important to avoid that programme administrators are affected by adverse incentives, than to introduce an explicit performance standard system to induce programme administrators to behave in line with the programme's objectives. The first natural question to ask is then: Why is this so? The second question is: can an explicit performance standard system improve upon these results, and if so, how should this system be designed? Although we cannot provide definite answers to these questions, we will provide some suggestive answers that, to our opinion, merit further research.
First, we believe that part of the success of this Belgian training programme is due to the explicit (reading and writing tests, and medical, psycho-technical and 'motivation' tests) and the implicit selection criteria (waiting list as a consequence of capacity constraints of the training centres) 27 rather than a consequence of well designed incentives to programme administrators. These selection criteria have imposed significant costs on programme participation. The high cost has the beneficial effect of inducing a self-selection process by which only workers with high returns to training participate. Of course, the advantages of this enhanced targeting need to be traded-off against the social cost of these tests and of the increased unemployment duration implied by the waiting period. It would be interesting to investigate the conditions under which the system is socially optimal. Note that the formal structure of this problem resembles very much that of models that justify the use of benefits in kind to increase the targeting efficiency of poverty alleviation. Indeed, as benefits in kind impose an "ordeal" by restricting the choices of beneficiaries, the tests and the waiting period impose an "ordeal" on the candidate trainees (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982 and Blackorby and Donaldson 1988) .
Another way to explain the positive results in the absence of explicit monetary incentives to programme administrators (see Box4) is that there are implicit non-monetary incentives inducing programme administrators and instructors of the training programmes to behave in line with programme objectives. These non-monetary incentives can consist in the intrinsic motivation of programme administrators, but also in professional standards implicitly imposed by peer comparison or in social norms imposing workers to obey to instructions. These kinds of non-monetary incentives will not be effective for all types of workers. It can be argued that they will have more impact on workers who have chosen to work in relatively low paying jobs of organisations pursuing "social" objectives. These kinds of jobs are more likely to be found in the public sector and in the non-profit sector, than in the private for profit sector. Economists know little about the conditions under which such non-monetary incentives work and about whether and how they could be shaped to attain pre-specified objectives (see Heckman, Smith and Taber 1996 for some discussion on this issue). In my opinion, this is a promising research area.
c) The Design of Performance Standards Systems for Labour Market Programmes 28
The first case study has shown that adverse incentives to programme administrators may be particularly harmful for the good functioning of a programme. This suggests that the introduction of performance standards that align objectives of administrators to those of the programme is crucial. This requires, however, that the goals be not only clearly defined, but that they can be measured. Since programme objectives are often the outcome of a political process involving compromise among competing fractions with different objectives, the objectives are often not clearly defined. Moreover, even if goals are clearly defined, these are often stated in terms of unobserved net social benefits. Performance-standards targets need, in contrast, to be written in terms of measured levels. These measured levels can differ significantly from the unobserved programme objectives. This difference can be induced by the higher mentioned selection bias, causing observed differences in outcomes between programme participants and non-participants to diverge from the programme impact. Alternatively, it can be caused by the need to define a more operational measure that is not directly related to the unobserved programme goal. For instance, performance-standards systems typically use short-run rather than long-run measures in order to provide quick feedback to programme managers, even though long run measures more closely approximate the notion of social benefit (Heckman et al. 1997, p. 390) . Finally, if programme objectives and performance measures diverge, programme administrators may "game" incentive schemes to maximise their personal rewards (Ibid. p.391). Heckman et al. (1997) assess the performance of the performance standards systems of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in the US. The JTPA runs the federal government's most important job-training programme for the poor. This study demonstrates that it is difficult to design adequate performance standards systems for labour market programmes that point administrators in the "right" direction. The study shows, for instance, that many measures, used as standards for the JTPA incentive scheme, are actually negatively related to the programme's long-run impact on trainees. "The performance standards system motivates therefore administrators to pursue outcomes unrelated, or even negatively related, to a major programme goal" (Heckman et al. 1997, p.391) . Moreover, Courty and Marschke (1997) provide ample evidence that programme administrators game the incentive schemes, leading to wasteful activity.
Designing adequate performance systems for labour market programmes is difficult. This difficulty underlines the importance of looking for alternative ways to align the behaviour of administrators to programme objectives. One way to go, is to search for easily measurable indicators that exhibit a strong correlation with programme objectives. Another way is to try to obtain a better understanding in how non-monetary incentives work. The second case study suggests that these non-monetary incentives might partly explain the success of the training scheme. Heckman et al. (1997, p.392 ) also stress that "the behaviour of employees of bureaucracies is influenced not only by incentives controlled by the agency, but also by their attitudes, ideology, and by the standards of external reference groups, such as the professional mores of social workers". Moreover, the authors argue that the JTPA objective to enrol the least advantaged into the programme is probably assured by the social worker mentality of most "street-level" bureaucrats, rather than by the incentive schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper we provided some guidelines for an efficient design of active labour market policies. First, we emphasised that the optimal design of these policies crucially depends on the main causes of unemployment persistence. Each diagnosis matches an alternative design. Second, we stressed the importance of providing adequate incentives to programme administrators of active labour market policies, and that this may well be more important than providing adequate incentives to the unemployed workers. To illustrate this point, we summarised two case studies evaluating active labour market policies in Belgium. The first one evaluated a work experience programme for welfare recipients. The second one analysed the short-term effect of vocational training programmes for unemployed workers on the probability of leaving unemployment. The first case study shows how inappropriate incentives to programme administrators may render a programme ineffective. In Europe, many direct job creation programmes in the public or the non-profit sector, but also systems of recruitment subsidies to the private sector, share common features of this adverse programme design. The second case study reveals how a programme without any explicit incentives can be effective. This finding was contrasted with the adverse effects found for U.S. training programmes, guided by an explicit system of performance standards. Both implicit non-monetary incentives and self-selection induced by a costly application process could explain the success of second case study. The challenge for economists is to obtain a deeper understanding of these factors of success.
